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THE CASE FOR MANDATORY DISCLOSURE 
IN SECURITIES REGULATION 
AROUND THE WORLD 
Allen Ferrell* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The desirability of mandatory disclosure requirements in securities 
regulation has long been a subject of debate among legal academics and 
economists. A number of prominent commentators have argued that 
mandatory disclosure requirements are unnecessary, and even harmful, as 
market forces will generally ensure that firms disclose the optimal level of 
information.1 For instance, Roberta Romano has argued for the removal of 
mandatory disclosure requirements in a series of important articles.2 
Proponents of mandatory disclosure have countered by arguing that the 
information released by firms generates important informational 
externalities.3 One such informational externality that has received 
significant attention is the possibility that firm disclosures may improve the 
stock price accuracy of firms other than the disclosing firm.4 Given that 
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 1. For scholars critical of mandatory disclosure, see HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND 
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979); George J. Benston, 
Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to 
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998); George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the 
Securities Markets, 37 J. BUS. 117 (1964); cf. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable 
Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 
(1998); Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: 
A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909 (1994). 
 2. See Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 1 (proposing that firms select which 
state’s regulatory regime will set their disclosure requirements); Roberta Romano, The Need for 
Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 387 (2001) 
[hereinafter Romano, The Need for Competition] (defending the proposal against various 
criticisms). 
 3. See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not 
Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1345–46 (1999) [hereinafter Fox, Retaining 
Mandatory Securities Disclosure] (arguing that certain firm disclosures will have effects on third 
parties, such as suppliers and customers, that will not be internalized by the firm); Merritt B. Fox, 
Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 
2498, 2562–69 (1997) [hereinafter Fox, Who Should Regulate]; cf. Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws 
and the Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1034–35 (1992). 
 4. See Fox, Who Should Regulate, supra note 3, at 2562–69; Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share 
Price Accuracy and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331 (2003). 
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firms will not consider these externalities when deciding which pieces of 
information to disclose, it is argued that a mandatory disclosure regime can 
be socially beneficial. 
Much of the debate to date has focused primarily on the merits of 
mandatory disclosure in the United States, where dispersed ownership 
structures are prevalent. This article focuses on whether mandatory 
disclosure can play a socially beneficial role in countries with concentrated 
ownership structures. Most countries around the world have concentrated 
ownership structures, including those of Continental Europe. This article 
argues that the case for mandatory disclosure in these countries does not 
hinge on whether there are informational externalities associated with firm 
disclosures—an issue that has dominated the academic debate over 
mandatory disclosure. Rather, the theoretical case for a demanding 
mandatory disclosure regime in these countries is based on the view that a 
demanding mandatory disclosure regime can reduce the level of diversion 
of corporate resources by controlling shareholders, and promote 
competition (both for capital and in the product market) against established 
firms. This theoretical case is backed by substantial empirical support.5 
Neither a reduction in the diversion of corporate resources nor an increase 
in competition is likely to be in the interests of existing controlling 
shareholders. However, as this article will show, these effects of mandatory 
disclosure are very likely to be in the interests of minority shareholders in 
countries with a high concentration of controlling shareholders. In countries 
such as the United States, which have dispersed ownership structures (but 
in many cases entrenched managers who may not always act in shareholder 
interest)6 mandatory disclosure can serve the interests of shareholders as a 
group as well. 
Examining the desirability of mandatory disclosure requirements is 
crucial given the important role these requirements play in modern 
securities regulation. A number of countries have adopted and/or 
strengthened mandatory disclosure requirements for their publicly traded 
firms in the last decade,7 and many more countries, including developing 
ones, are considering doing the same.8 Indeed, the quality of disclosure 
                                                                                                                 
For a useful model capturing the effects of informational externalities associated with firm 
disclosures, see Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure 
Regulation and Externalities, 13 REV. FIN. STUD. 479 (2000). 
 5. See infra section III.B. 
 6. See infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 7. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, in 
CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 33, 52–53 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & 
Mark J. Roe eds., 2004). 
 8. See, e.g., JUZHONG ZHUANG ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCE IN EAST 
ASIA (2000); Eur. Comm’n, Internal Market Directorate General, Towards an EU Regime on 
Transparency Obligations of Issuers whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated 
Market, Consultation Document of the Services of the Internal Market Directorate General (2001) 
(proposing EU-wide disclosure requirements). 
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regulation was a particular focus in the aftermath of the East Asian financial 
crisis of 1997–1998, which many have blamed, at least in part, on poor firm 
transparency in the region.9 
But is mandatory disclosure really necessary? The traditional case, 
which suggests it is not because market forces alone will compel firms to 
disclose, is outlined in Part II of this article. The theoretical case for 
mandatory disclosure, this article will argue, begins with the observation 
that the level of diversion of corporate resources by controlling shareholders 
is, on average, substantial in countries with concentrated ownership 
structures. These private benefits of control can theoretically be reduced to 
some extent by the adoption of a mandatory disclosure regime. The 
empirical literature that documents the size of controlling shareholders’ 
private benefits of control is discussed in Part III.A. Part III.B. predicts that 
controlling shareholders’ private benefits of control can be reduced by a 
country’s adoption of a mandatory disclosure regime. If this prediction is 
true, then existing controlling shareholders will tend to have a preference 
for a lax disclosure regime. The empirical literature that is relevant to 
determine whether there is a linkage between disclosure regulation and the 
level of private benefits of control is also discussed in detail in Part III.B. 
This literature, it is argued, supports the view that mandatory disclosure 
sometimes substantially reduces controlling shareholders’ private benefits 
of control. 
However, neither the existence of substantial private benefits of control 
nor the potential for reduction of these benefits through the adoption of a 
mandatory disclosure regime is sufficient to establish the desirability of 
mandatory disclosure in countries with concentrated ownership structures. 
For example, it is possible that private benefits of control merely represent a 
transfer of value from minority shareholders to controlling shareholders, 
with no net social losses. The effect of mandatory disclosure on 
competition—for capital and in the product market—must be considered 
when evaluating whether existing controlling shareholders’ tendency to 
prefer a lax disclosure regime will result in social losses. Part III.C.1 argues 
that a mandatory disclosure regime can reduce the cost of external finance 
to potential competitors of firms owned by existing controlling 
shareholders. Part III.C.2 then argues that existing controlling shareholders, 
including those shareholders of firms raising external finance for the first 
time, may prefer a lax disclosure regime as a means of reducing the ability 
                                                                                                                 
 9. See, e.g., Simon Johnson et al., Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis, 58 J. 
FIN. ECON. 141 (2000) (emphasizing overall poor corporate governance as responsible for East 
Asian crisis); Todd Mitton, A Cross-Firm Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Governance on the 
East Asian Financial Crisis, 64 J. FIN. ECON. 215, 216 (2002); Joseph Stiglitz, Address to the 
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations: The Role of International Financial Institutions in the 
Current Global Economy (Feb. 1998), available at 
http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/papers.cfm. 
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of potential competitors to raise external finance. This socially undesirable 
reduction of competition can occur along two dimensions: a reduction in 
competition for capital and a reduction in competition in the product 
market. Part III.C.2 presents empirical evidence consistent with the 
conclusion that the level of competition along both these dimensions would 
be positively affected by the presence of a mandatory disclosure regime.10 
The fact that some (and perhaps most) controlling shareholders would 
prefer a lax disclosure regime as a means to protect their private benefits of 
control and reduce competition does not necessarily imply that firms that do 
find it in their self-interest to credibly commit to a demanding disclosure 
regime cannot do so. Nevertheless, Part IV argues that willing firms will 
not necessarily be able to credibly commit. Part IV.A. discusses how a 
willing firm might credibly commit to such a regime, but also addresses 
how governments and exchanges might very well not adopt a demanding 
disclosure regime, even if there is firm demand for one, given the 
opposition of those firms that do not find it in their self-interest. Moreover, 
as Part IV.B.1 emphasizes, competition between a country’s domestic 
exchanges for investors’ order flow will not necessarily result in a “race to 
the top” in terms of disclosure requirements imposed by exchanges on listed 
firms. Part IV.B.2 then looks at the pre-mandatory disclosure regulation of 
exchanges in the United States as a test case to see whether competition 
between exchanges will result in a demanding disclosure regime being 
offered by at least some exchanges. This section argues that prior to 
governmental pressure on exchanges to adopt demanding disclosure 
regulation, the level of disclosure imposed on firms by U.S. exchanges, 
including the New York Stock Exchange, was quite low. Part IV.C. 
discusses why international competition between exchanges for listings is 
not a perfect substitute for a country’s home exchange or government 
adopting meaningful disclosure regulation. Part IV.D. explains why firms, 
through provisions in their corporate charters and other contractual 
arrangements, are often unable to credibly commit to a demanding 
disclosure regime through unilateral action. 
A common argument for mandatory disclosure is that it ensures that the 
cheapest cost producer of firm-specific information, the firm itself in many 
circumstances, actually produces and discloses this information to the 
markets. This has the socially beneficial effect, the argument goes, of 
preventing traders from generating the same information but at a higher 
cost. Part V argues that this standard argument does not, standing alone, 
constitute a reason to favor mandatory disclosure. Rather, the force of this 
argument ultimately depends on whether firms are willing and able to 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE 
CAPITALISTS (2003) for a general argument that investor protections can encourage product 
market competition. 
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credibly commit to a demanding disclosure regime—the issues addressed in 
Parts III and IV. 
Finally, Part VI examines empirical studies of the effect of mandatory 
disclosure on stock returns, volatility and financial development. In contrast 
to the conclusions of scholars opposed to mandatory disclosure, this article 
concludes, in Part VII, that the empirical evidence strongly supports the 
view that mandatory disclosure often has socially beneficial effects. 
II. THE TRADITIONAL CASE AGAINST MANDATORY 
DISCLOSURE 
The earliest comprehensive evaluations of the effects of a firm’s 
disclosure decision, in the work of Sanford Grossman and Olivier Hart, 
among others, contained a powerful conclusion: In a world in which a firm 
has private information about the quality of its product and disclosure is 
costless, firms will voluntarily publicly disclose their private information as 
a signal of their products’ quality.11 The reason for this is simple but 
significant: Firms will voluntarily disclose information so as not to be 
confused by customers with firms with lower quality products. Firms with 
high quality products will, therefore, voluntarily commit to a disclosure 
regime that credibly commits the firm to full public disclosure. Firms with 
product quality a notch below that of these high quality firms will then 
voluntarily commit to a full disclosure regime so as not to be confused with 
firms with even lower quality. Eventually, the market completely unravels 
with all firms voluntarily disclosing their product quality, even if it is 
poor.12 
This elegant and intuitively appealing signaling story has been the main 
theoretical support for the contention that market forces alone will ensure 
the optimal level of voluntary disclosure by firms. Most prominently, 
Roberta Romano, in her articles advocating the removal of mandatory 
disclosure requirements, relies heavily on this signaling story for her 
theoretical case against the need for mandated disclosure in securities 
regulation.13 Simply put, firms that wish to maximize the value of their 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See S. J. Grossman & O. D. Hart, Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35 J. FIN. 323 
(1980); see also Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private 
Disclosure About Product Quality, 24 J.L. & ECON. 461 (1981) [hereinafter Grossman, The 
Informational Role of Warranties]. In the Grossman-Hart model, there are sanctions for lying but 
no sanctions for non-disclosure. 
 12. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties, supra note 11. 
 13. See, e.g., Romano, The Need for Competition, supra note 2, at 418 (“The signaling 
hypothesis regarding information disclosure is a plausible scenario in today’s capital markets. . . .  
It is therefore theoretically difficult for advocates of mandated disclosure to maintain their 
normative claims.”). Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 683 (1984) (“Once the firm starts disclosing it cannot 
stop short of making any critical revelation, because investors always assume the worst. It must 
disclose the bad with the good, lest investors assume that the bad is even worse than it is.”). 
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shares will disclose to ensure that investors do not mistakenly assign a 
positive probability that the firm is withholding information that would 
reveal a low firm value and, hence, assign a low value to the firm’s shares.14 
The signaling argument as applied to firm disclosure decisions retains 
some of its power despite the unrealistic assumption that disclosure is 
costless. Disclosure can obviously create a variety of costs for firms, 
ranging from the cost of gathering, verifying and releasing information to 
the loss of competitive advantage resulting from the release of proprietary 
information. While these costs might lead a firm to rationally refrain from 
disclosing some information, this simply means that firms will trade off the 
costs and benefits of disclosure.15 Who better to make this trade-off, many 
argue, than firms who will suffer the consequences of making the wrong 
decision? After all, there is no reason to believe that firms will not optimize 
their disclosure decisions so that the marginal costs and benefits of 
disclosing are equated. 
The signaling story, and hence its use as the linchpin for the case 
against mandatory disclosure, however, falls short as a basis for policy on 
two crucial points. First, the signaling argument relies on the assumption 
that those who set firm policy, such as entrenched managers and controlling 
shareholders, want to credibly commit to a disclosure regime that will 
maximize the market’s current valuation of the firm. For the reasons given 
in Part III, this is simply not true for many firms in most countries. This 
group of unwilling firms can even include firms selling shares to the public 
for the first time. Second, the signaling argument relies on the assumption 
that firms can credibly commit to any desired level of disclosure. Again, 
this is less likely to be true than one might initially think. Part IV explains 
why some firms are unable to credibly commit to a high level of disclosure 
even if they might find it in their self-interests to do so. 
III. DO FIRMS WANT TO CREDIBLY COMMIT? 
Empirical evidence indicates that many controlling shareholders around 
the world divert corporate resources to themselves on a substantial scale. 
Logic and empirical evidence suggest that controlling shareholders’ ability 
to engage in this diversion of corporate resources can be adversely affected 
by the imposition of mandatory disclosure requirements. Equally important, 
mandatory disclosure requirements can have the effect of increasing 
competition for capital and competition in the product market by decreasing 
the cost of external finance to new entrants and potential competitors. This 
increased competition would be to the detriment of existing firms with 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See Romano, The Need for Competition, supra note 2, at 544, 562. 
 15. See, e.g., Robert E. Verrecchia, Discretionary Disclosure, 5 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179 (1983), 
for a model in which disclosure is costly. 
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controlling shareholders. These different considerations deserve in-depth 
examination. 
A. CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE DIVERSION 
Most firms around the world have controlling shareholders.16 The 
dispersed ownership structures of the United States and the United 
Kingdom are an exception. For this reason, it is crucial to consider the 
preferences of controlling shareholders when thinking about disclosure 
decisions for most firms around the world.17 
Given the prevalence of concentrated ownership around the world, the 
potential conflict between the interests of controlling shareholders and those 
of minority shareholders is a significant problem facing corporate and 
securities regulators in most countries.18 As is widely recognized, 
controlling shareholders will tend to ignore the harm caused to minority 
shareholders’ interests when deciding which actions the firm should take. 
More to the point, controlling shareholders will have an incentive to divert 
corporate assets to themselves at the expense of existing minority 
shareholders. 
The empirical evidence strongly indicates that diversion of corporate 
resources by controlling shareholders is an economically important and 
widespread phenomenon. This empirical literature consists of studies that 
have attempted to directly measure the private benefits of control accruing 
to the controlling shareholder (and not to other shareholders), as well as 
studies documenting the widespread existence of so-called “tunneling”—
the phenomenon of corporate assets being transferred from the firm to a 
controlling shareholder through a variety of mechanisms.19 “Tunneling” 
includes such activities as transferring assets at below-market price from 
                                                                                                                 
 16. In the United States, in contrast, it is more important to focus on the preferences of 
managers of firms with dispersed ownership, who may have some degree of entrenchment against 
shareholder wishes, as well as the preferences of the firms’ shareholders. See Rafael La Porta et 
al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1146 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Law and 
Finance]; Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997) 
[hereinafter La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance]; see also Marco Becht & 
Ailsa Röell, Blockholdings in Europe: An International Comparison, 43 EUR. ECON. REV. 1049, 
1050 (1999). 
 17. See Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate 
Governance? (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 491, 
2004), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Bebchuk_et% 
20al_491.pdf. for an index measuring managerial entrenchment for U.S. firms. The degree of 
managerial entrenchment, as measured by this index, is correlated—with 1% statistical 
significance—with firm valuation. Moreover, firm valuation is monotonically decreasing in the 
entrenchment index. Id. at 17. 
 18. See generally REINIER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2004) (discussing the main issues in corporate and 
securities law). 
 19. See Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (2000), for examples of 
tunneling. 
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firms where the controlling shareholder has relatively low cash-flow rights 
to firms where the controlling shareholder has higher cash-flow rights.20 
Several studies have documented that private benefits of control often 
take the form of “tunneling” in a wide range of countries.21 For instance, 
one study found that in India it is not uncommon for more than 25% of the 
profits in firms where the controlling shareholder had low cash-flow rights 
to be transferred to firms where the controlling shareholder has high cash-
flow rights when there is a positive shock to the firm’s cash flow.22 Studies 
that have measured the private benefits of control enjoyed by controlling 
shareholders have consistently found that control of a company is typically 
worth a great deal, indicating that as a result of their control, controlling 
shareholders receive benefits (including via diversionary activities such as 
“tunneling”) not generally available to other shareholders. In Italy, for 
instance, the average value of control is worth an amazing 37% of the 
equity value of the firm.23 More generally, control was worth, on average, 
an impressive 14% of the equity value of the firm in a sample of thirty-nine 
countries. The sample included both developing and developed countries 
ranging from Colombia to the United States.24 Nevertheless there is wide 
variation across countries. At one extreme, the estimated value of control in 
some countries, like Brazil, is in the range of 65% of the equity value of the 
firm. At the other extreme, corporate control in Japan is estimated to be 
worth negative 4% of the equity value of the firm.25 
B. DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE DIVERSION 
Widespread diversion of firm assets by controlling shareholders has 
implications for firms’ disclosure decisions. There are good reasons to 
believe that the more firms engage in diversion of corporate resources, all 
else being equal, the more the controlling shareholders will prefer to keep 
these activities hidden from public view.26 A lax disclosure regime will 
likely have the effect of making it easier for controlling shareholders to 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See generally id. 
 21. See infra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. 
 22. Marianne Bertrand, Paras Mehta & Sendhil Mullainathan, Ferreting out Tunneling: An 
Application to Indian Business Groups, 47 Q. J. ECON. 121 (2002). 
 23. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International 
Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 551 (2004). 
 24. Id. Other studies have likewise found that corporate control has, on average, a substantial 
economic value. See Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A 
Cross-Country Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 325 (2003); Luigi Zingales, The Value of the Voting 
Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 125 (1994); cf. Luigi 
Zingales, What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?, 110 Q. J. ECON. 1047 (1995). These 
studies find a substantial value placed on owning the control block in most cases, despite the fact 
that control block ownership entails some potential costs as well, such as a lack of diversification. 
 25. Dyck & Zingales, supra note 23, at 551. 
 26. This preference can exist even if everyone knows that firms, on average, are engaged in 
these activities. 
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divert corporate resources to their benefit: The more information there is 
available about a firm’s operations, assets and ownership, the easier it is for 
shareholders and regulators to uncover when, how and to whom diversion is 
occurring. 
Detection of diversion through increased disclosure might have a 
number of unwanted consequences for the controlling shareholder. 
Detection might lead, of course, to legal action. Even in countries with poor 
legal protections for investors there is some legal response, at least 
sporadically, to expropriation of firm assets that is sufficiently egregious.27 
Indeed, in extreme enough cases, public pressure might provoke action 
from regulators. In addition to any legal consequences, there might well be 
reputational costs for a controlling shareholder that has been publicly 
identified as particularly likely to engage in egregious conduct. 
Furthermore, recent empirical work suggests that a reputation for 
transparency and good governance can affect firm valuation.28 
The empirical evidence is consistent with the view that it can be in the 
strong self-interest of controlling shareholders who enjoy high levels of 
private benefits of control for there to be low levels of firm transparency.29 
One study found that the higher the level of private benefits of control of 
firms in a country, the lower the level of disclosure (as captured by the 
degree of earnings management firms engage in) by firms in that country.30 
This study consisted of a sample of thirty-one countries, including 
developing as well as developed countries. Another recent finding is that an 
increase in mandatory disclosure requirements in a country is associated 
with a substantially lower level of private benefits of control for controlling 
shareholders in that country.31 
Increased disclosure can reduce the private benefits of control. Todd 
Mitton conducted an important study of firms from Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand during the East Asian financial 
crisis of 1997–1998 and found that firms with high levels of disclosure (by 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See Christian Leuz & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Political Relationships, Global Financing 
and Corporate Transparency 3 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No. 03-16, 2003), 
available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/03/0316.pdf. 
 28. See Jordan Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting U.S. 
Securities Laws?, 75 J. FIN. ECON. 319 (2005). 
 29. This is not to say, of course, that the only factor affecting the level of private benefits of 
control is transparency, or even, more generally, the quality of the regulatory regime. Other non-
legal factors have been found to be important. See, e.g., Marco Pagano & Paulo Volpin, The 
Political Economy of Finance, 17 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 502 (2001). It is worth bearing in 
mind, by way of caution, that none of these studies definitively establish a causal link between 
firms’ disclosure preferences and the level of private benefits of control (as is typically the case 
for studies in this area). 
 30. See Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 27. 
 31. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What Works in 
Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1, 16, 19 (2006) (two-standard-deviation increase in their “disclosure 
index” associated with a 13% decrease in the premium paid for control blocks). 
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virtue of having securities trading in the United States or having an auditor 
from a (then) “Big Six” accounting firm) had substantially better stock 
return performance during the crisis.32 One plausible explanation for these 
abnormal stock returns is that diversion of corporate resources is likely to 
be particularly severe during financial crises,33 but firms with high levels of 
disclosure experienced lower levels of corporate diversion because of the 
increased transparency of any diversion that is undertaken. 
Another piece of evidence comes from studies of firms that cross-list. 
Empirical research has found that the benefits to firms from countries with 
weak disclosure and investor-protection regimes of cross-listing onto U.S. 
exchanges are often substantial. Cross-listings are associated with more 
accurate analyst forecasts—arguably an indication of a richer information 
environment—and increased firm valuation.34 Improvements in firm 
valuation are particularly significant for firms cross-listing from countries 
with the weakest disclosure and investor-protection regimes.35 Despite the 
apparent substantial benefits of cross-listing, relatively few of the firms 
eligible for cross-listing take advantage of this opportunity. Less than 10% 
of firms eligible for cross-listing onto the U.S. markets do so.36 Many firms 
are apparently satisfied with their regulatory environments and the 
associated high levels of private benefits of control, despite the cost to firm 
valuation. 
Another study investigated the effect of a country having an active 
media on the level of private benefits enjoyed by controlling shareholders.37 
The effects were quite strong. A one-standard-deviation increase in the 
level of the active press variable translated into a reduction in the value of 
the private benefits of control by 6.4%.38 This evidence is consistent with an 
increased ability of the public to scrutinize questionable behavior, in this 
case through the press, limiting the ability of controlling shareholders to 
extract private benefits. 
Other studies have focused on politically connected firms and firm 
transparency. Again, the evidence demonstrates that firms prefer to avoid 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Mitton, supra note 9, at 217 (stating that having an ADR resulted in a higher stock return 
relative to other firms during the East Asian crisis of 10.8% and having a Big Six accounting firm 
was associated with a higher return of 8.1%). 
 33. See Johnson et al., supra note 9, at 142 (arguing that expropriation increased during the 
crisis). 
 34. Mark H. Lang, Karl V. Lins & Darius P. Miller, ADRs, Analysts, and Accuracy: Does 
Cross Listing in the United States Improve a Firm’s Information Environment and Increase 
Market Value?, 41 J. ACCT. RES. 317 (2003). 
 35. See Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in 
the U.S. Worth More? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8538, 2001), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8538.pdf. 
 36. Id. at 1. 
 37. See Dyck & Zingales, supra note 23, at 582–86 (where the level of activity of the press 
was proxied by the number of newspapers sold per 100,000 residents). 
 38. Id. at 586. 
2007] The Case for Mandatory Disclosure 91 
demanding disclosure regimes that might publicly expose uncomfortable 
facts. For example, politically connected firms in Indonesia during the reign 
of Soeharto, were significantly less likely to have securities publicly traded 
abroad.39 More specifically, these firms were significantly less likely to 
have debt or equity traded on the U.S exchanges and thereby avoided U.S. 
disclosure requirements.40 One plausible explanation for this finding is that 
these firms desired to hide questionable transactions with their political 
backers and state-owned banks. Causation is difficult to establish, however, 
as the availability of favorable financing from state banks could have 
reduced the need for external finance.41 
Of course, the mere fact that controlling shareholders might want to opt 
into a lax disclosure regime does not by itself indicate that such a decision 
is socially undesirable. It is possible that the controlling shareholder values 
the diverted resources as much as the shareholders who would otherwise be 
the beneficiaries.42 In other words, diversion of corporate resources might 
constitute a mere transfer with no net social loss. Moreover, the ability to 
engage in diversion might conceivably serve as compensation to the 
controller for the costs associated with monitoring the firm’s managers. 
These costs might include a lack of diversification and liquidity associated 
with holding a large control block of stock in a single company and the time 
and effort incurred by the controller in the course of monitoring firm 
management.43 
When evaluating how likely it is that there are no net social losses 
associated with a lax disclosure regime, two considerations need to be kept 
in mind. First, even if private benefits of control merely represent a transfer 
from minority shareholders to controlling shareholders or efficient 
compensation for the monitoring services provided by the controller, the 
effects of a lax disclosure regime—adopted as a means to protect these 
transfers—on competition, growth and financial development must be 
considered. Once these effects are taken into account, it is questionable how 
innocuous the decision to opt into a poor disclosure regime really is. The 
empirical evidence suggests that the effects of lax disclosure regimes on 
competition, growth and financial development are both detrimental and 
nontrivial.44 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Leuz & Olberholzer-Gee, supra note 27, at 3. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id. at 3–4 (discussing this possibility). 
 42. Most models of expropriation, however, do assume that there is a cost associated with 
diversion of corporate resources. See, e.g., Mike Burkhart, Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, Why 
Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders, 106 J. POL. ECON. 172 (1998). 
 43. See Anat R. Admati, Paul Pfleiderer & Josef Zechner, Large Shareholder Activism, Risk 
Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1097 (1994) (discussing the costs 
associated with holding large blocks). Of course, if control is guaranteed by holding shares with 
disproportionate voting rights, the diversification and liquidity costs of control will be reduced. 
 44. See discussion infra Part III.C. for a discussion of this evidence.  
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Second, it is also worth emphasizing that once firms have sold shares to 
minority shareholders, controlling shareholders will not necessarily find a 
mandatory disclosure regime in their self-interest for the simple reason that 
some of the benefits of such a regime will accrue to the benefit of minority 
shareholders.45 Minority shareholders would benefit because they were able 
to initially purchase their shares at a discount reflecting a higher expected 
level of diversion than is possible under a more demanding, mandatory 
disclosure regime.46 Selling shares at such a discount might be the optimal 
course of action if it turns out that, at the time the shares were sold, no 
demanding disclosure regime was available and supporting the creation of 
such a demanding disclosure regime was either infeasible or would have 
created potentially unwanted competition. 
On a more general note, research has found that there is a negative 
correlation between the presence of controlling shareholders and the 
strength of the legal protections provided to investors.47 One common 
explanation for this finding is that as private benefits of control are lower 
and hence the attractiveness of retaining control reduced, the stronger are 
the legal protections of investors (such as mandatory disclosure 
requirements).48 Outside investors, such as non-controlling shareholders, 
will be willing to pay more for claims on the firm’s profits given the lower 
level of expected diversion of corporate resources. 
                                                                                                                 
 45. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in 
Corporate Ownership and Governance, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 69, 83–92 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004). 
 46. See Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenzon, Investor Protection and Equity Markets, 66 J. 
FIN. ECON. 3, 17–18 (2002). The Shleifer-Wolfenzon model is cast in terms of investors’ legal 
protections. Their model is easily adopted to apply to disclosure requirements. See Michael 
Greenstone, Paul Oyer & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and 
the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments, 121 Q. J. ECON. 399, 406 (2006), for an adoption of 
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 47. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate 
Ownership around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999). The La Porta et al. “anti-directors” index, a 
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disclosure levels of firms in a country and that country’s “anti-directors” index are, not 
surprisingly, highly correlated. See Christian Leuz, Dhananjay Nanda & Peter D. Wysocki, 
Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 
505 (2003). 
 48. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and 
Control (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7203, 1999), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7203.pdf (showing that fewer private benefits of control can lead to 
more dispersed ownership structures). 
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C. DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION 
1. Reducing the Cost of External Finance 
In addition to affecting the ability of controlling shareholders to divert 
corporate resources, the presence of a demanding disclosure regime also 
can lead to a lower cost of capital for firms reliant on external finance. This 
consequence is potentially quite important for those firms that do not have 
sufficient internal sources of capital to participate in investment 
opportunities. This group of firms would likely include young firms with 
high-growth prospects but relatively few internal sources of capital. Larger, 
more established firms are more likely to have internal sources of capital 
and ties to financial institutions that can provide credit. 
There are at least three mechanisms by which a demanding disclosure 
regime can reduce the cost of external finance: Reducing adverse selection 
costs, reducing the level of private information held by traders and reducing 
the expected level of diversion of corporate resources. Consider first the 
effect of demanding disclosure on adverse selection costs. A standard set of 
models in corporate finance indicates that there is an adverse selection cost 
to raising external finance that can be reduced with improved disclosure. In 
the absence of sufficient firm-specific public information, the market will 
assign a positive probability that a firm with valuable assets—such as a firm 
with substantial profits and promising growth prospects—is in fact a firm 
with low-value assets.49 This makes it less likely that high-value firms will 
raise external finance to fund attractive investment opportunities, as their 
shares will sell at a discount to their true value. This discount represents the 
adverse selection cost that these high-value firms experience when raising 
external finance. High-value firms will be more likely to raise external 
finance if improved disclosure of firm-specific information is available at 
the time the firm is raising capital, given the increased ability of the market 
to differentiate between high-value and low-value firms.50 
The second reason why the cost of external finance might be lower in a 
regime with demanding disclosure requirements is the effect such a regime 
has on the level of private information that traders hold about the true value 
of the firm. Credible, public firm disclosures can have the effect of 
displacing information that was, or would have been, generated by privately 
informed traders.51 This is important because recent theoretical and 
                                                                                                                 
 49. The classic adverse selection papers are Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 
Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do 
Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1984) and Stewart C. Myers, The Capital Structure Puzzle, 39 J. 
FIN. 575 (1984). 
 50. Consistent with this, voluntary levels of disclosure by firms are higher around the time 
firms access the capital markets for capital. See Mark Lang & Russell Lundholm, Cross-Sectional 
Determinants of Analyst Ratings of Corporate Disclosures, 31 J. ACCT. RES. 246 (1993). 
 51. For evidence that firm public disclosures can displace private information, see Stephen 
Brown & Stephen A. Hillegeist, Disclosure Quality and Information Asymmetry (Goizueta Bus. 
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empirical research indicates that securities with a high level of private-
information trading have higher expected returns.52 And, of course, a higher 
expected return, all else being equal, implies a higher cost of capital. This 
association between levels of private-information trading and expected 
returns suggests that there is value to a firm in not only credibly committing 
to meeting demanding disclosure standards at the time external finance is 
being raised, but also credibly committing at the same time to meeting 
demanding disclosure requirements in the future as well.53 
Finally, the availability of external finance can be enhanced by 
mandatory disclosure because a firm can demand more per share if it is able 
to credibly commit to a low level of diversion of corporate assets through 
such a disclosure regime. The equity of a firm will be worth more because a 
larger percentage of the firm’s profits will end up being used for the benefit 
of all the shareholders. Moreover, an increase in the amount of publicly 
available information could also have the effect of reducing the costs to 
minority shareholders of monitoring controlling shareholders and 
management to ensure that corporate diversion is not occurring.54 The 
reduced cost of external finance for firms that have attractive investment 
opportunities and can credibly commit to reduced levels of diversion can 
result in a reallocation of capital from firms that have less attractive 
investment opportunities to firms with more attractive investment 
opportunities.55 
A reduced cost of external finance for firms issuing securities also has 
implications for the availability of venture capital financing for these firms 
prior to the time they ultimately issue securities to the public. The option 
for venture capitalists to “cash out” their investments by selling securities in 
the firm to the public on favorable terms in the event that the company is 
successful could very well make it more likely that venture capital funding 
will be forthcoming in the first place.56 One study has documented that 
                                                                                                                 
Sch. Paper Series, Paper No. GBS-ACC-2005-001, 2005), available at http://gbspapers.library. 
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 52. Id. at 16. 
 53. See discussion infra Part V. for a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on this 
association. 
 54. See Davide Lombardo & Marco Pagano, Law and Equity Markets: A Simple Model, in 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY 343, 351 (Joseph A. 
McCahery et al. eds., 2002) (modeling the effect of reduced monitoring costs on the equilibrium 
rate of return on equity). 
 55. See Shleifer & Wolfenzon, supra note 46, at 16 (establishing this result when capital is not 
perfectly mobile across countries). 
 56. See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital 
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 255–56 (1998). 
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venture capital funding increases in the wake of countries introducing more 
demanding mandatory disclosure requirements.57 
Empirical evidence clearly suggests that the presence of a demanding 
disclosure regime enables firms (especially cash-poor, high-growth firms) 
to raise needed external finance on favorable terms. Studies have found that 
many of the firms that cross-list in the United States, and thereby commit 
themselves to the U.S. disclosure regime, are in fact cash-poor, high-growth 
firms from countries with poor disclosure regimes (and poor investor 
protections generally) that need to raise external finance.58 Cross-listing, 
either through reputational or legal bonding, apparently enables firms to 
credibly commit to a demanding disclosure regime. 
More generally, countries whose firms have higher levels of 
transparency in their earnings reports enjoy lower costs of capital.59 
Consistent with this, industries and firms in countries with strong investor 
protection requirements rely more on external finance to raise capital. For 
instance, countries with stronger investor protection requirements have a 
larger number of firms going public (relative to the country’s GDP).60 
Comparing the relative success of the different securities regulations 
instituted by the Czech Republic and Poland in the 1990s is instructive.61 
One of the most striking differences between these countries’ two regimes 
was in their disclosure requirements. While Poland imposed demanding 
disclosure requirements on firms with publicly traded securities, the Czech 
Republic did very little. For instance, securities could not begin trading on 
Poland’s markets unless a firm prospectus was available. The Czech 
Republic required none. Poland required monthly, quarterly and semi-
annual disclosures by firms. The Czech Republic did not require any such 
disclosures. Poland’s level of financial development, including initial public 
offerings and the amount of external finance raised, far exceeded that of the 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See RAJAN & ZINGALES, supra note 10, at 254 (discussing evidence gathered by Jorg 
Kukies for his Ph.D. dissertation “Stock Markets for High-Technology Firms and Venture Capital 
Financing”).  
 58. See Marco Pagano, Ailsa A. Röell & Josef Zechner, The Geography of Equity Listing: 
Why Do Companies List Abroad?, 57 J. FIN. 2651 (2002) (discussing that high-growth firms in 
need of external finance more likely to cross-list onto the U.S. markets); William A. Reese, Jr. & 
Michael S. Weisbach, Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-listings in the United 
States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 65 (2002) (showing that firms planning 
to raise capital tend to cross-list). 
 59. See Utpal Bhattacharya, Hazem Daouk & Michael Welker, The World Price of Earnings 
Opacity, 78 ACCT. REV. 641 (2003) (discussing the study of 34 countries over the 1985–1998 
period). 
 60. See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, supra note 16, at 
1142–45. 
 61. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons 
from Securities Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1 (1999); Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson, & 
Andrei Shleifer, Coase Versus the Coasians, 116 Q. J. ECON. 853 (2001). 
96 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 2 
Czech Republic throughout the 1990s.62 Perhaps not coincidentally, the 
private benefits of control in Poland were 11% of firm value, while in the 
Czech Republic they were 58% of firm value.63 
2. Increasing Competition 
More demanding disclosure requirements have an important effect not 
only on firms that rely on external finance, but also for those firms—such 
as large, well-established, low-growth firms—that do not. Better financing 
opportunities for potential competitors are generally not in the interests of 
these firms.64 Therefore, in addition to protecting any private benefits of 
control that may exist, these firms have an additional and separate reason to 
be strongly opposed to the institution of a more demanding disclosure 
regime. These firms will be opposed to a demanding disclosure regime 
being made available to (potential) competitors that rely on external 
finance. Recent evidence helps explain exactly how firms that do not rely 
on external finance will be disadvantaged by improved disclosure 
requirements. 
Firms in industries with significant needs for external finance (high-
growth opportunities relative to internal cash flows), such as the 
pharmaceutical industry with the substantial costs of drug development, 
grew substantially faster during the 1980s in countries with more 
demanding accounting-disclosure standards than firms in those same 
industries in countries with weak accounting-disclosure standards.65 Equally 
importantly, the same study found that there was more competition in these 
external finance-dependent industries, as measured by the number of new 
entrants, in countries with demanding accounting standards.66 In other 
words, in industries that rely heavily on external finance for funding, 
competition increased as a result of the presence of demanding mandatory 
disclosure requirements. The people harmed by demanding disclosure 
requirements in environments with more demanding mandatory disclosure 
requirements appear to be firms with sufficient sources of internal capital 
for their investments as a result of the increased competition they face. 
Or consider the effect on a firm from a country with a poor disclosure 
regime of other firms from that country cross-listing onto a foreign 
exchange. A few studies have examined the effect of a firm’s decision to 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson, & Andrei Shleifer, Coase Versus the Coasians, 116 
Q. J. ECON. 853 (2001) (comparing financial development of Czech Republic and Poland during 
the 1990s). 
 63. See Dyck & Zingales, supra note 23, at 563. 
 64. See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial 
Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2003) (examining the effect of 
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 65. See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. 
ECON. REV. 559 (1998). 
 66. See id. at 572. 
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cross-list onto the U.S. markets on similarly situated firms that do not cross-
list. These studies have found that firms not cross-listing experience a 
negative stock price reaction.67 One needs to be cautious, however, in 
interpreting these findings. While these studies do indicate that non-cross-
listed firms are apparently harmed by the cross-listing decisions of other 
firms, it is not clear from these studies what is responsible for this negative 
price reaction. The prospect of increased competition due to increased 
access to capital for a firm’s rivals, or the possibility that the market draws 
a negative inference about the non-listing firms (such as their growth 
prospects) are just two possible causes. 
The ability of a firm to credibly commit to a demanding disclosure 
regime not only increases competition in the product market by funding 
new entrants, but can also increase competition among firms for capital. 
This can lead some firms to oppose a demanding mandatory disclosure 
regime even if they have not yet sold (but are planning to sell) shares to the 
public. If capital is not perfectly mobile across borders (i.e. the supply of 
capital is not perfectly elastic), a situation which appears to be the case for 
most countries,68 then the enhanced ability of some firms to receive external 
finance by credibly committing to a demanding disclosure regime implies 
that the country’s interest rate increases.69 More demand for external 
finance, all else being equal, implies a higher interest rate in equilibrium 
given the fact that capital is scarce. Firms that are planning a securities 
offering now face, unhappily, a higher discount rate (i.e. the economy’s 
interest rate) for the shares they are selling. Indeed, some firms will not be 
able to raise sufficient capital by selling shares unless they operate in a lax 
disclosure regime, given the higher discount rate associated with increased 
competition for capital. 
Supporting these theoretical predictions on the effect of a legal regime 
on risk-adjusted returns, Davide Lombardo and Marco Pagano found that 
countries with higher-quality legal regimes (as captured by indexes that 
capture a country’s respect for the rule of law and the efficiency of the 
country’s judicial system) have higher risk-adjusted returns.70 Also 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See Michael Melvin & Magali Valero-Tonone, The Effects of International Cross-Listing 
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consistent with these predictions is the finding in another recent study that 
stock markets that impound more firm-specific information are associated 
with an improvement in the allocation of capital across industries.71 
Interestingly, other empirical studies have found that mandatory disclosure 
is associated with more firm-specific information being impounded into 
stock prices.72 
Moreover, research has found that there is an improvement in capital 
allocation in countries with strong legal protections for investors.73 This 
improved allocation of capital from stronger legal protections resulted in 
“declining industries” receiving less funding relative to those in firms with 
better growth prospects. In other words, “declining industries” appear to be 
losers in legal systems with more demanding investor rights.74 
In short, there is an extensive (and growing) body of evidence that 
supports the position that a number of firms have powerful reasons to be 
opposed to more demanding disclosure requirements if this means that 
these disclosure requirements will likewise be made available to other 
firms. Improved disclosure can have the effect of increasing competition by 
enabling firms without sufficient internal sources of capital to receive 
funding. This competition can take the form of increased competition for 
scarce capital and increased product-market competition. Competition, and 
the “creative destruction” of firms that it unleashes, is potentially quite 
threatening to established firms with internal sources of cash and well-
established ties to banks and other financial institutions, as well as those 
firms that wish not to compete with others for the external finance they 
receive. 
It is worth emphasizing that the desire to suppress competition through 
neglect of the legal infrastructure necessary to create and support robust 
competition can exist even if there are no controlling shareholders who 
enjoy, and wish to continue to enjoy, substantial private benefits of control. 
Moreover, firms can have this preference for a lax disclosure regime for this 
anti-competitive reason even at the time they are selling shares to the 
public, despite the discount in share price this will cause. 
Of course, when there are substantial private benefits of control present, 
studies indicate that there is likely a real, and potentially quite significant, 
cost in terms of foregone competition, growth and financial development 
resulting from a preference on the part of controlling shareholders for a lax 
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disclosure regime as a means of retaining their ability to divert corporate 
resources unimpeded. This is true even if such diversion is a mere transfer 
between shareholders or such diversion represents, in part, compensation to 
the controller for its monitoring costs. 
D. FIRMS THAT STILL WANT TO COMMIT 
As noted, there will undoubtedly be some firms that do want to commit 
to a high-quality disclosure regime. This group might include some 
controlling shareholders who are willing to forgo the opportunity to divert 
some corporate resources in order to capture the increase in the value of the 
controller’s ownership stake associated with operating under a high-quality 
disclosure regime. In other words, the controller’s share of the efficiency 
gains from selecting a higher quality disclosure regime might, if the 
magnitude is sufficiently large, more than offset the controller’s decreased 
ability to divert corporate resources.75 While substantial private benefits of 
control are common around the world, there are still a number of countries 
where the average private benefits are modest. Even in situations where 
private benefits of control are high, some controlling shareholders might 
want to attempt to capture the efficiency gains from improved corporate 
governance by purchasing the minority shareholder stakes at depressed 
prices and then commit to a firm-value-maximizing disclosure (and 
investor-rights protection) regime.76 Finally, this group of willing firms will 
also likely include some firms that need to raise external finance and 
venture capital funding to capitalize on investment opportunities. 
All this leads to the following question: Why should policymakers be 
concerned about the disclosure levels of those firms that want to credibly 
commit to a disclosure regime that maximizes firm valuation and reduces 
the cost of external finance? If there are firms that wish to so commit will 
not the market or a responsive government provide a means for these firms 
to do so? As it turns out, there are powerful reasons why government and 
the market might not provide the necessary tools for this group of firms to 
credibly commit to a high-disclosure regime even when such firms find it in 
their self-interests to do so. 
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IV. CAN FIRMS CREDIBLY COMMIT? 
A. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF VESTED INTERESTS 
There are four different possibilities for how a firm might credibly 
commit to a demanding disclosure regime. First, the government, perhaps 
responding to firm demand for better disclosure requirements, could 
provide such a disclosure regime. Second, the exchange in the firm’s 
country, through its listing requirements, could insist that certain disclosure 
standards be met by exchange-listed firms. Third, firms in countries with 
lax disclosure regimes might cross-list onto exchanges in countries that 
provide a more demanding disclosure regime. Fourth, firms in their 
individual capacities could attempt, through various contractual and 
corporate charter provisions, to create such a regime for themselves. 
Whether government responds to the demands of some firms to make 
improved disclosure standards available to them will be impacted by the 
opposition of other firms—often the larger, well-established firms—to the 
prospect of increased competition. It is not surprising that in many instances 
governments around the world, perhaps responding to this powerful interest 
group, have failed to provide the legal infrastructure that would enable 
firms to commit to a high-quality disclosure regime, despite the possibility 
that there are firms that so desire.77 The true costs to the public at large of 
such inaction are often not readily apparent. 
When considering the likely response by domestic exchanges to a 
demand for improved disclosure requirements, it is worth bearing in mind 
that a number of the likely firm beneficiaries of improved access to external 
finance and venture capital are likely not even listed, or eligible for listing, 
on an exchange, given their firm size and stage of development. Indeed, 
some exchanges require that a firm be profitable for a certain number of 
years before the firm is even eligible for listing. That excludes exactly those 
firms that are least likely to have internal sources of capital or well-
established ties to financial institutions. In other words, the beneficiaries of 
improved disclosure standards will often be outsiders to the internal 
decision-making process of the exchange when it is setting its listing 
standards. Not surprisingly, exchanges have proven quite responsive to the 
demands of their largest listed firms—those firms least likely to be the 
primary beneficiaries of a lower cost of external finance or increased 
venture capital funding. 
The famous one-share-one-vote controversy over the New York Stock 
Exchange’s (NYSE) listing rules is a good illustration of this solicitousness. 
Since 1926, the NYSE has had an exchange-listing rule expressly 
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prohibiting dual-class common stock.78 When General Motors, one of the 
larger NYSE-listed companies, issued dual-class common stock in 1982 in 
clear violation of this rule, the NYSE refused to take any action against 
General Motors. Indeed, the NYSE seriously considered changing its 
longstanding rule prohibiting dual-class common stock in response to 
General Motors’ actions. The issue was finally moot when the SEC stepped 
in and restricted the use of dual-class common through regulation.79 
There is also some evidence that a similar dynamic was at work in the 
pre-mandatory disclosure period in the United States. The NYSE appeared 
to be reluctant to impose meaningful disclosure requirements on listed firms 
at the turn of the century due to the opposition of firms with controlling 
shareholders, often families, who preferred not to be bound to disclose 
information.80 Not until the exchange was under intense governmental 
pressure did the NYSE meaningfully improve its disclosure requirements in 
1910.81 
The refusal of government or an exchange to create or enforce a 
meaningful disclosure regime can, of course, be a reasonable decision. 
Creating a mandatory disclosure regime, with meaningful levels of 
enforcement, is an expensive and, perhaps even more importantly, 
complicated undertaking. To the extent there is court involvement in 
enforcement, perhaps adjudicating lawsuits or reviewing a governmental 
agency’s enforcement actions, the court system must be up to the task. This 
includes tolerable levels of judicial corruption and some minimal level of 
expertise on the part of judges in assessing the merits of these actions. The 
same will be true for any private enforcement and adjudication process that 
might be established by an exchange. In addition, establishing workable 
definitions of concepts likely to be central in any mandatory disclosure 
regime, such as what constitutes a “material” misstatement, is likely to 
prove, if the U.S. experience is any guide,82 to be a complicated endeavor. 
Moreover, there will inevitably be a need in any mandatory disclosure 
regime for regulations and guidelines to be continually clarified and 
updated as business conditions change and new fact patterns present 
themselves. 
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The costs that a country or an exchange must incur if it is going to 
establish a meaningful mandatory disclosure regime for firms with publicly 
traded securities are thus clearly non-trivial. Incurring these costs at any 
point in time will only make sense if there is a sufficient number of firms 
with publicly traded securities, or firms considering going public, that 
might benefit from such a regime at that time. 
But this creates a serious timing problem. In a situation where there is, 
perhaps quite reasonably, a poor disclosure and investor-rights regime, the 
most efficient system might very well be the presence of controlling 
shareholders who can monitor management and internalize the costs of 
expropriation.83 And, in fact, developing countries have a strong tendency 
towards concentrated ownership.84 Controlling shareholders of firms that 
already have minority shareholders by the time it begins to make sense to 
incur the costs of establishing a mandatory disclosure regime will have an 
incentive to oppose a change in the disclosure regime irrespective of 
whether the change is being considered by government or the firms’ 
exchange(s).85 Likewise, entrenched managers of firms with dispersed 
ownership structures will attempt to protect any private benefits of control 
they enjoy. To make matters more difficult, non-controlling shareholders of 
these firms might also find it in their interest to oppose the adoption of a 
more demanding disclosure regime, even if this would reduce the incidence 
of corporate diversion by controlling shareholders and entrenched managers 
to their benefit, if the result is likely to be an increased level of competition 
faced by the firm. 
This is not to say that these vested interests can never be overcome; that 
is obviously false. It is merely to say that the fact that firms in a country or 
an exchange operate under a lax disclosure regime does not imply that 
mandated disclosure cannot substantially improve matters. To this point, the 
analysis has focused on the political economy implications of having firms 
with a vested interest in a lax disclosure regime. But how does the 
willingness of an exchange to impose demanding disclosure requirements 
through its listing standards change when competition between exchanges is 
introduced? 
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B. COMPETITION BETWEEN DOMESTIC EXCHANGES 
1. Theory 
It is argued that desire to attract the trading volume of investors will 
ensure that exchanges institute demanding disclosure requirements as a 
prerequisite to listing on the exchange. This is so because investors value 
disclosure and will route their stock orders accordingly. Based on this 
reasoning, Paul Mahoney and others have argued that exchanges should be 
vested with the responsibility of setting disclosure standards.86 
How this competition for trading volume and listing business will work 
out has been fleshed out in different ways. Mahoney, for instance, argues 
that “[o]ne important source of risk [to investors] is the divergence of 
investor viewpoints about the company’s performance. The company can 
reduce this divergence by making financial and other disclosures.”87 As a 
result, this will increase the “desirability of listed companies as investment 
vehicles.”88 Huddart, Hughes and Brunnermeier (HHB), to take another 
prominent example, have attempted to capture in a formal model the 
intuition that exchanges competing to maximize trading volume will offer 
demanding disclosure standards.89 
In the HHB model, exchanges will attempt to capture the trading done 
by uninformed, liquidity traders—traders who have no private information 
about the firms’ true values but need to trade given their liquidity needs—
even while simultaneously attempting to attract listings from firms whose 
corporate insiders wish to engage in insider trading.90 The model implies 
that there will be a “race to the top”91 for disclosure standards. That 
argument relies on the plausible assumption that uninformed liquidity 
traders prefer not to trade, all else being equal, against informed traders. An 
exchange with a demanding disclosure regime reduces the likelihood in 
their model that uninformed liquidity traders are trading against informed 
traders. Corporate insiders prefer to conduct their trades where they can 
“hide” among a large number of liquidity traders even at the expense of 
having some of their private information publicly revealed as a result of the 
exchange disclosure rules. Hence, exchanges will voluntarily offer 
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demanding disclosure standards given their preference, a preference shared 
by corporate insiders,92 to attract the trades of liquidity traders. 
Neither of these particular lines of reasoning is entirely convincing. As 
for the Mahoney argument, the precise connection between the desirability 
of a security as an investment and divergence of investor viewpoints is not 
spelled out. Even assuming that a decrease in the divergence of investor 
viewpoints will result in reduced systematic risk, this will not necessarily 
render the securities more attractive as an investment, as the risk-adjusted 
return will, in an efficient market, remain the same. Investors will simply 
enjoy a lower return as a result of bearing less systematic risk. At this point, 
the relative attractiveness of securities with high disclosure and those with 
low disclosure as an investment will remain the same. 
Nor does the HHB model constitute a firm basis for arguing that 
exchanges will institute demanding disclosure requirements and, thereby, 
ensure that listed firms meet demanding disclosure standards even in the 
absence of mandatory disclosure. The HHB model normalizes all securities 
returns, regardless of where the security trades, to zero.93 It is this 
assumption that drives their conclusion that liquidity traders have a 
preference for high-disclosure exchanges given the fact that the only 
difference between securities trading on different exchanges is the 
probability of incurring a loss by trading against informed traders. 
However, it is very much an open question in the finance literature whether 
securities with higher levels of informed trading have the same return as 
securities with lower levels of informed trading.94 Fundamentally, they 
formally make the assumption implicit in Mahoney’s argument: Exchange 
features that are unattractive to investors, such as lax disclosure standards, 
are not priced by the market. 
Most importantly, neither argument addresses what happens when 
exchange rules affect the ability of those who control firms to engage in 
diversion of corporate assets or the level of competition faced by the 
firms—an ability, incidentally, that is not obviously affected by which 
exchange attracts liquidity traders. An exchange will have a powerful 
incentive to provide a lax disclosure regime if enough listed companies on 
an exchange, or firms eligible for listing on that exchange, have an interest 
in a poor disclosure regime. This will be so even if it implies a higher cost 
of external finance for firms as a result of undesirable exchange rules being 
priced by the market. Indeed, an attempt by an exchange to maximize 
trading volume might very well lead it to offer a lax disclosure regime so as 
to maximize the number of listed securities traded on the exchange. 
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The experience of the U.S. in the pre-mandatory disclosure period (pre-
1933) has often been relied upon in attempting to figure whether exchanges 
will adopt demanding disclosure requirements out of self-interest. This 
experience may provide useful insights into the issue. 
2. The U.S.’s Pre-Mandatory Disclosure Experience 
A common claim is that the existence of demanding disclosure 
requirements imposed by exchanges in the U.S. in the decades immediately 
prior to the imposition of mandatory disclosure in the 1930s is powerful 
evidence that exchanges, left unencumbered, have the proper incentives 
when setting disclosure requirements through their listing standards.95 
During this pre-mandatory disclosure period, the NYSE, while the most 
important exchange, faced domestic competition from some thirty-three 
other exchanges, some with significant trading volume. And, indeed, it is 
true that the disclosure standards a firm had to meet as a condition to listing 
on the NYSE, as of 1931, were extensive.96 Firms had to provide balance 
sheets and income statements for the prior two years and earnings 
statements for the prior five years. These balance sheets and income 
statements had to be updated periodically. Firms also had to provide a 
written description of how they calculated depreciation. Depreciation 
methods could not be changed without publicly providing details of any 
change in a firm’s annual report.97 
There are several reasons, however, for why the demanding nature of 
the NYSE’s listing requirements circa 1931 is not as powerful a piece of 
evidence against the need for mandatory disclosure as often claimed. The 
NYSE’s requirement that firms update their financial statements—a crucial 
component of any meaningful disclosure regime—were in fact, in large 
part, a result of governmental pressure. Prior to the Panic of 1907, the 
NYSE placed no general obligation on listed firms to periodically update 
their financial information.98 Moreover, at this time the NYSE allowed 
securities of firms not listed on the exchange nevertheless to trade on it (so-
called unlisted trading). These unlisted firms did not have to meet the 
disclosure requirements contained in the NYSE’s listing standards. The 
volume of unlisted trading transactions on the NYSE was substantial, with 
very little disclosure by these unlisted firms.99 
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The Hughes Commission, established by the state of New York in the 
aftermath of the Panic of 1907, was charged with investigating the practices 
of the NYSE.100 As a result of its investigation, the Hughes Commission 
Report (the Report) recommended that the NYSE “adopt methods to 
compel the filing of frequent statements of the financial condition of the 
companies whose securities are listed, including balance sheets [and] 
income . . . accounts.”101 Moreover, the Report recommended that the 
“unlisted department, except for temporary issues, [ ] be abolished.”102 
Wisely, the NYSE adopted most of the Report’s recommendations, 
including enforcing an obligation to periodically update balance sheet and 
income statements and prohibiting unlisted trading.103 
The NYSE was not alone. The New York Curb Exchange, an important 
competitor to the NYSE, was strongly criticized in the Report for its lack of 
listing standards. After the Report came out, the New York Curb Exchange 
adopted listing standards.104 These listing standards were later significantly 
strengthened in the aftermath of the crash of 1929, when the New York 
Curb Exchange’s practices were the subject of Senate hearings. 
However, while the NYSE had extensive disclosure requirements in 
place by 1931, it is highly questionable whether there was any meaningful 
enforcement. The only penalty that the NYSE could impose for non-
compliance was de-listing. Not surprisingly, this was an action undertaken 
in only the rarest of cases. And while unlisted trading was barred on the 
NYSE after 1910,105 unlisted trading, with little or no disclosure 
requirements, continued to constitute a substantial portion of trading on 
many of the other exchanges. 
None of this is to suggest that exchanges have no incentive to impose 
disclosure standards. Nor does the U.S. history of listing standards even 
show that exchanges in the pre-mandatory disclosure period adopted 
insufficiently rigorous disclosure standards. A recital of disclosure 
standards and enforcement mechanisms cannot establish this. What the 
historical evidence canvassed above does undermine, though, is the 
common claim106 that the pre-1933 U.S. experience demonstrates that 
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demanding mandatory disclosure requirements are unnecessary because 
exchanges will provide and enforce such requirements. 
Not only did exchanges not demand and/or enforce disclosure 
requirements before 1910, but most firms, rarely voluntarily submitted 
meaningful annual reports during this period. Indeed, at this time many 
important firms released no annual reports. The annual reports that were 
released tended to be quite short, with relatively little in the way of detail. 
Major companies, such as the International Silver Company and the 
American Tin Plate Company, whose stock was traded on the NYSE, 
released very few details of any sort in their annual reports. The Eastman 
Kodak annual report of 1903107 is representative of a number of annual 
reports of this time period. Nevertheless, there were still some companies—
most notably U.S. Steel, starting with its annual report of 1903—that did 
provide relatively in-depth financial information.108 In short, the overall 
level of disclosure contained in the annual reports during this time period 
was low, but not uniformly low. 
In considering the relevance of the U.S. experience to other countries, it 
is worth noting that in many countries there simply is no meaningful 
competition between domestic exchanges. Many countries have a single, 
dominant domestic exchange where most order flow is executed. This is not 
surprising given the powerful liquidity network externalities of trading: 
Traders want to trade where other traders already are. Moreover, many 
exchanges around the world are far from independent market organizations. 
Government supervision and oversight of exchanges has historically been 
far greater, for example, in Continental Europe than the United States.109 
C. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION FOR LISTINGS 
Competition between a country’s domestic exchanges is not, of course, 
the only source of competitive pressure faced by a given exchange. There is 
increasing international competition among exchanges, which undoubtedly 
can powerfully change the incentive structure of exchanges. Perhaps the 
most dramatic example of this is the response of the Scandanivian stock 
exchanges to competition for investors’ orders from other European 
exchanges.110 In response to this competitive challenge, the Scandanivan 
stock exchanges (beginning with the Stockholm Stock Exchange in 1993111) 
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demutualized, converting themselves into for-profit, shareholder-owned 
organizations. 
This international competition does not stop at order flow, but extends 
to competition for listings. Listing standards, as well as execution services 
for investors’ orders, are an important part of the “product” offered to firms 
by exchanges. The most important example of this phenomenon is the 
NYSE’s sustained efforts to attract cross-listings from firms around the 
world, which the Exchange has done with considerable success: 
Approximately 15% of all NYSE-listed firms are foreign firms.112 
A firm’s listing on the U.S. markets, especially for firms from 
developing countries with poor disclosure requirements (as well as poor 
investor legal protections among a variety of other dimensions) does in fact 
constitute an important mechanism by which a firm can commit to a higher 
level of disclosure.113 Firms that list on a U.S. exchange are subject to many 
of the basic U.S. disclosure requirements.114 These mandated disclosures 
typically include disclosure of the identity of shareholders with more than 
5% of the shares, along with the standard Exchange Act reports. 
The ability of firms to cross-list on foreign exchanges, and thereby 
bond themselves to more demanding disclosure regimes, does reduce the 
need for mandatory disclosure with respect to firms whose decision-makers 
find a more demanding disclosure regime in their self-interest. There is 
some evidence that cross-listing is a successful strategy for these firms and 
that the source of this success is, in part, due to bonding.115 Cross-listings 
have been found to be beneficial to firms. They are associated with more 
accurate analyst forecasts and increased firm valuation.116 Improved firm 
valuation is particularly significant for firms cross-listing from countries 
with weak disclosure and investor-protection regimes.117 
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At the same time, the available evidence indicates that cross-listing is 
still a highly imperfect substitute for having a strong disclosure regime in 
the firm’s home country. SEC enforcement actions against cross-listed 
firms are rare and often ineffective. Misconduct occurring in foreign 
countries is hard to detect and a low enforcement priority for the SEC. The 
traditional enforcement mechanisms are simply not well suited to cross-
border actions.118 
Finally, cross-listing is often not a feasible strategy for many firms that 
are at a relatively early stage of development and need external finance.119 
The disclosure regime for many firms is therefore largely limited to 
whatever is offered by that firm’s home-country or domestic exchange.120 
Moreover, of course, the possibility of cross-listing does not address the set 
of firms that are content with a lax disclosure regime even when this creates 
social costs. 
D. FIRMS ACTING IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES 
What if a demanding disclosure regime is not available to a firm from 
its home country, domestic exchange or through cross-listing? Can a firm 
credibly commit to a demanding disclosure regime through charter 
provisions or other contractual arrangements? In other words, can a private 
contract remedy deficiencies in governmental and exchange regulation? 
The answer is very likely no, at least much of the time. All the 
difficulties of establishing a mandatory disclosure regime apply a fortiori to 
firms acting in their individual capacities. The ability of any individual 
firm, through its charter provisions or other contractual arrangements, to 
recreate for itself a credible mandatory disclosure regime is highly limited 
regardless of the benefits. For example, the firm will find it difficult to 
commit to disclosing bad information in the future. While this might be the 
optimal commitment ex ante, firms will sometimes find it in their self-
interest ex post not to publicly release bad news.121 Without binding 
contracts, spelled out in sufficient detail in advance and actually enforced 
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through the imposition of real penalties for non-compliance by courts or 
private adjudicators, this will be virtually impossible to do.122 Moreover, 
there are obvious economies of scale associated with implementing and 
running a mandatory disclosure regime, such as a settled format for the 
presentation of information, not easily achievable by a firm in isolation. 
In addition, there is some evidence that suggests a firm’s ability to 
commit to a demanding disclosure regime is affected by whether a country 
has the infrastructure necessary to make such a commitment credible. 
Specifically, a recent empirical study has found that the number of auditors 
a country has (scaled by population) affects the opacity of firms’ 
disclosures in that country.123 An increase in the number of auditors in a 
country decreases the opacity of firms’ earnings disclosures.124 Firms in 
isolation will likely be unable to create the infrastructure, including a well-
established auditing profession, necessary to support a credible disclosure 
regime. 
Indeed, the consistent finding in the law and finance literature that “law 
matters” for firm valuation, specifically that the lack of certain legal rules 
and institutions can harm firm valuation, indicates that firms are often 
unable to employ contracting arrangements as an effective substitute for 
their desired legal regime.125 
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR MANDATORY DISCLOSURE 
The fact that there will often be no means for firms credibly to commit 
to a demanding disclosure regime implies that making such a regime, 
whether mandatory or not, available to these firms would constitute a 
substantial and much-needed improvement for many countries. One could 
imagine a number of ways such a change could occur, including making it 
easier for firms to cross-list onto foreign exchanges. 
The advantage of mandating a demanding disclosure regime lies in the 
fact that not all firms will want to credibly commit to such a regime even 
when it is socially beneficial for them to do so.126 Furthermore, and on a 
more practical note, a crucial aspect of any disclosure regime is that firms 
be credibly bound to disclose in the future, perhaps many years later, 
information that the firm might not, at that point in time, wish to disclose. 
Even if firms find it in their strong interests to bind themselves ex ante to a 
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demanding disclosure regime, say because the firm wishes to raise external 
finance, there will be strong incentives for a firm to later switch to a less 
demanding disclosure regime. 
The most obvious and straightforward way to accomplish the necessary 
commitment, especially in countries with weak overall legal infrastructures, 
is to make disclosure requirements mandatory. There is no evidence, at this 
point, to indicate that firms, especially firms in countries with weak legal 
infrastructures, can in fact credibly bind themselves, through purely 
contractual devices such as supermajority voting rules in the firm charters 
not to engage in opportunistic abrogation of a previously chosen, more 
demanding disclosure regime.127 In sharp contrast, there is substantial—and 
growing—evidence, some of which has already been discussed, that 
mandatory disclosure requirements can have a beneficial effect.128  
Finally, it should not be overlooked that as a practical matter, many 
countries face the decision whether to have a mandatory disclosure regime 
or to leave matters as they currently stand. Policy analysis should shed 
some light on this choice. 
V. INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY AND THE DUPLICATIVE 
INVESTMENT ARGUMENT FOR MANDATORY 
DISCLOSURE 
While there are strong arguments that mandatory disclosure can be 
beneficial, this does not mean, of course, that all arguments for mandatory 
disclosure are convincing. The “duplicative investment” argument for 
mandatory disclosure is one of these.129 Given its prominence and 
plausibility, this argument merits careful attention. This argument 
ultimately depends on whether firms are willing and able to credibly 
commit to a demanding disclosure regime. 
The “duplicative investment” argument for mandatory disclosure 
requirements is based on the highly plausible assumption that firms are the 
cheapest cost producers of at least some firm-specific information relevant 
to firm valuation. Mandatory disclosure is a way of ensuring that firms, 
rather than traders, produce this information. In the absence of mandatory 
disclosure, this information might instead be generated by traders who wish 
to capitalize on this information in their trading. If the cost to traders of 
generating this private information is higher than the cost to the firm of 
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disclosing the information, then mandatory disclosure can play the socially 
beneficial role of ensuring that these unnecessary costs are avoided.130 
Paul Mahoney has argued that this reasoning is unconvincing because 
there is no clear evidence that public disclosures required by mandated 
disclosure actually contain information that has not already been 
impounded into the stock price by privately informed traders prior to the 
public disclosure.131 There is, however, substantial evidence that the 
information contained in mandatory disclosures can have the effect of 
displacing private information not already reflected in the stock price.132 
Consider the empirical literature on the effect a firm’s mandated public 
disclosures have on the bid-ask spread133 of that firm’s stock. If the public 
information contained in the firm’s mandatory disclosure acts as a 
substitute for private information then the effect of increased public 
disclosure by a firm should be to reduce informational asymmetry (the 
disparity between uninformed and informed investors). This should, in turn, 
result in a reduction of the bid-ask spread, given the well-established fact 
that a reduction in informational asymmetry in a stock will reduce the bid-
ask spread of that stock, all else being equal.134 
Indeed studies have borne this out. The SEC requirement that firms 
report their performance broken down by business segment when the firm is 
in more than one line of business has been found to reduce bid-ask 
spreads.135 Similarly, the mandated disclosure of the value of oil and gas 
reserves was also found to reduce bid-ask spreads.136 Firm disclosures of 
management’s forecasts of what the future might hold for the company also 
reduce bid-ask spreads.137 
The reason that the “duplicative investment” argument is not a reason 
standing alone to favor mandatory disclosure is that there are good reasons, 
both theoretical and empirical, to believe that higher levels of informed 
trading do in fact result in higher expected returns. However, as the 
expected return on a firm’s security rises, so does the cost of external 
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finance for that firm. If those in charge of the firm wish to minimize the 
cost of external finance, they will take this fact into account in deciding 
whether to commit to a demanding disclosure regime.138 An exchange, for 
instance, with a lax disclosure regime might for this reason be unattractive 
to a firm if one were willing to assume that those in charge of the firm care 
to minimize the cost of external finance. Refusal to make such an 
assumption forms the real basis of the case for mandatory disclosure. 
Why might higher levels of informed trading result in higher expected 
stock returns? Several important papers have recently addressed this 
question.139 Consider an uninformed investor who buys an optimally 
diversified portfolio. Despite diversifying, this investor will nevertheless do 
worse on average than investors with private information, who are better 
able to select stocks in constructing their portfolios. Whether the 
uninformed investor transacts frequently or not, the investor will likely end 
up holding poorly performing stocks relative to the portfolio held by 
informed investors.140 A reduction in the amount of private information held 
by other traders will reduce this difference in the portfolios held by 
informed and uninformed traders, and, as a result, reduce the risk to 
uninformed investors that they will end up holding comparatively poorly 
performing stocks in their portfolios. 
This reasoning implies that the inferior ability of uninformed investors 
to pick stocks cannot be diversified away. Consider an uninformed investor 
who decides to purchase a diversified portfolio and hold it indefinitely. If 
there is private information at the time the investor constructs the portfolio 
then he will be more likely to hold stocks that are comparatively poor 
performers. Moreover, the decision to hold the same portfolio indefinitely 
will levy a real cost if the investor needs to rebalance his portfolio in 
response to changes over time in wealth, liquidity needs and risk 
preferences. Uninformed but rational investors, knowing of this cost ex 
ante, will require a higher rate of return to compensate them for the costs 
created by this inflexibility. 
One might object that this reasoning relies on the assumption that there 
are two categories of investors: those who hold private information and 
those who do not. What if the analysis is moved back a step? Suppose it is 
unclear ex ante whether any particular investor will acquire private 
information at some point in the future? What if all investors know is that in 
the future there will be asymmetrical information, but not whether they 
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themselves will be the holders of private information? If this is true then it 
might appear that informational asymmetry does not create, on net, costs for 
investors. If an investor ends up being a holder of private information then 
he will earn more, given his increased ability to buy attractive stocks and 
sell unattractive stocks, than those who do not have this information. On the 
other hand, if an investor ends up being an uninformed investor then he will 
earn less than his informed counterparts by exactly the amount that the 
informed investors benefit from their private information. Viewed in this 
way, these two effects of informational asymmetry are ex ante a wash and, 
as a result, investors will not demand a higher rate of return on stocks that 
have higher levels of informational asymmetry. 
But this reasoning ignores, as a recent model by Nicolae Garleanu and 
Lassa Pedersen illustrates, that in the presence of informational asymmetry, 
investors will anticipate that the portfolios they will hold in the future will 
differ from what would otherwise be the case in a situation where there was 
no informational asymmetry.141 Given the presence of private information, 
there will be times when an informed investor will refuse to sell a stock 
despite having a liquidity reason to do so. This will occur if the investor has 
sufficiently good private news about the stock. At the same time, there will 
be times when an informed investor will sell a stock if he has sufficiently 
bad private news about the stock, despite having no other reason to alter his 
portfolio.142 
In other words, the introduction of informed traders changes the 
portfolio decisions that investors would otherwise make because of a desire 
to take advantage of private information. This represents a cost, albeit a cost 
informed investors are willing to bear to take advantage of their 
information. While the direct effect on investors of future private 
information is zero because the bid-ask spread does not represent a net cost, 
there is a change in the portfolio decisions of investors from what would 
otherwise be the case. Therefore, it follows that adverse selection increases 
costs through its effect on portfolio decisions as portfolio decisions are 
distorted as the result of the presence of private information. The costs of 
these distortions should be reflected in stock returns. 
There is empirical evidence that informational asymmetry does, in fact, 
appear to have an important effect on stock returns.143 David Easley, Soeren 
Hvidkjaer and Maureen O’Hara employ an empirical measure, developed in 
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a series of earlier papers,144 that measures how much private information-
based trading occurs in a stock (the so-called PIN measure) in order to 
investigate the effect of private information on expected stock returns.145 
Looking at NYSE-listed stocks for the 1983–1998 period they found 
that stocks with higher probabilities of private information-based trading, 
controlling for a number of factors, had higher rates of return than 
otherwise comparable stocks with lower levels of private information-based 
trading.146 Importantly, the probability of private information-based trading 
still affected stock returns even after a control for bid-ask spreads was 
implemented. Indeed, bid-ask spreads did not have any role in explaining 
stock returns in their study.147 
While important research, the Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara study does 
have some shortcomings that should be kept in mind. First, market beta and 
the coefficients on book-to-market and firm size had no statistical 
significance in explaining the cost of capital in their study. This is 
inconsistent with prior empirical research that has found these factors have 
power to explain stock returns.148 Moreover, it is conceptually puzzling that 
commonly identified sources of systematic risk, in particular stock market 
co-movement, have no measurable effect on stock returns. 
Second, the study did not control for the level of public information 
concerning firm value. While more private information was associated with 
higher expected returns,149 the study did not control for whether this 
association still held when controlling for the amount of public information 
available. This failure to control for the level of public information is 
problematic, given the fact that private and public information, whether 
they are substitutes or complements, could very well be correlated. This 
calls into some question the results of the study’s regressions. 
VI. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE RELATIVE SUCCESS 
OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE REGIMES 
While there are strong reasons to believe that mandatory disclosure 
requirements can be socially and economically beneficial, this obviously 
does not mean that the actual implementation and administration of any 
particular mandatory disclosure regime will prove to be so. It is not hard to 
imagine the various ways in which government regulation of disclosure 
could go awry. Regulators will inevitably have imperfect information 
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concerning which pieces of information, if disclosed, will improve the 
performance of the capital markets. Moreover, regulators will have 
imperfect incentives to seek out the needed information. 
An example of a regulatory regime gone astray would be a mandatory 
disclosure regime that focuses on requiring irrelevant information to be 
released. Indeed, some commentators have argued that this is what the SEC 
has done in regulations implementing the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Exchange Act of 1934.150 Even if disclosure requirements mandate the 
release of potentially relevant information, firms might subvert the 
regulatory regime by meeting the technical requirements of the disclosure 
regime while actually avoiding disclosure of specific pieces of information 
they would rather keep hidden.151 
At the end of the day, it is fair to say that whether any particular 
mandatory disclosure regime, as actually instituted and administered, is 
socially beneficial is an empirical question. Whatever the benefits, there 
might be more-than-offsetting costs. The empirical evidence that directly 
attempts to measure the effects of mandated disclosure (some of which has 
already been discussed) can help address this question. 
A. WHAT TO TEST FOR? 
A major weakness in the empirical literature on the effects of 
mandatory disclosure has been a lack of a firm theoretical basis for the 
testing that has been conducted. Fortunately, recent theoretical research has 
begun to provide the necessary theory to provide a solid basis for focusing 
on stock returns, volatility and the size of a country’s equity market. 
Understanding this theory is crucial as it provides the necessary framework 
with which to interpret the empirical findings on mandatory disclosure. 
1. Stock Returns 
Empirical research on mandatory disclosure has typically measured the 
effects of changes in mandatory disclosure on the stock returns of firms 
affected by these changes. Measuring these effects has a solid theoretical 
basis: If an unexpected improvement in mandatory disclosure requirements 
reduces agency costs, such as reducing the diversion of corporate resources, 
this should result in positive abnormal returns for the set of companies 
affected by the change.152 The lower level of future expected agency costs 
will be capitalized into the current stock price to the benefit of current 
shareholders. 
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Whether stock returns of firms subject to and affected by more 
demanding disclosure requirements, once the benefits of lower agency costs 
have been capitalized into the stock price, depends on whether the costs 
borne by shareholders on an ongoing basis to minimize agency costs are 
reduced by the change in mandatory disclosure. If more demanding 
disclosure requirements reduce these costs, such as monitoring and auditing 
costs, then risk-adjusted stock returns should be lower.153 This is because 
with lower expected costs, shareholders can be induced to hold equity with 
a lower expected return. Net of costs, shareholders will do just as well as 
before. Conversely, if the costs borne by shareholders are unaffected by a 
more demanding disclosure regime, stock returns of affected firms should 
not be affected, once the future benefits of reduced agency costs are 
capitalized into the stock price. 
2. Volatility 
Several empirical studies of mandatory disclosure have measured the 
volatility of stock returns pre- and post-implementation of mandatory 
disclosure. Assuming that the effect of mandatory disclosure, if it is 
working, is to cause the earlier release of information by firms, then the 
variance-bound finance literature indicates that this should result in lower 
stock-return volatility.154 Earlier release of information ensures that the 
information has less of an impact on a firm’s stock price assuming a 
positive discount rate. In other words, information concerning a more 
distant future event is more heavily discounted than information concerning 
an event in the immediate future. As a result, information released earlier in 
time will have less of an impact on a firm’s stock price. 
Unfortunately, there is also literature that suggests high levels of 
volatility can be a sign of more informed stock prices. In cross-country 
studies, markets with high levels of stock-price synchronicity (defined as 
the extent to which stocks tend to move together) tend to be in less-
developed, more volatile, markets.155 Moreover, firms with high levels of 
firm-specific volatility have stock prices that better predict future earnings 
of the company.156 This all suggests that volatility may or may not be a 
useful variable in testing the effects of mandatory disclosure on stock 
prices. 
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3. Size of the Equity Market 
A number of studies have examined the effect of legal rules, including 
mandatory disclosure requirements, on financial development. One standard 
proxy for financial development is the size of a country’s stock market 
capitalization held by non-controlling shareholders, scaled by a country’s 
GDP. Increases in financial development can, in theory, be caused by legal 
rules, including mandatory disclosure requirements, that reduce private 
benefits of control, and thereby enable more extensive use of external 
finance by firms. 
On a cautionary note, however, establishing such a causal link through 
correlations between financial development and legal rules is difficult, 
given the need to convincingly control for country-specific factors besides 
differences in legal regimes across countries. Moreover, reverse causation is 
also a plausible possibility, in that financial development may create a 
shareholder constituency that demands, and ultimately receives, improved 
legal protections.157  
B. THE UNITED STATES AS A CASE STUDY 
Though the United States has a substantially higher incidence of 
dispersed ownership structures than other countries,158 the effect of 
mandatory disclosure in the United States is still quite useful in assessing 
the possible effects of mandatory disclosure in other countries for several 
reasons. First, a nontrivial portion of companies in the United States have 
concentrated ownership structures.159 The mean ownership of the three 
largest shareholders in the United States is approximately 20%.160 
Moreover, the levels of concentrated ownership in the U.S. were substantial 
in some earlier markets, such as the over-the-counter market circa 1962.161 
Therefore, the United States is not as drastically different from, and as a 
result provides a more reasonable point of comparison to, those countries 
that have concentrated ownership structures, one might first believe. 
Second, mandatory disclosure arguably serves a similar function in the 
United States as in countries with concentrated ownership in terms of 
controlling agency costs even though there are differences in the nature of 
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the agency problem.162 Finally, many of the studies of mandatory disclosure 
have focused on the United States because of the availability of data, which 
is high due to the United States’ now fairly long history of mandating 
disclosure. Ignoring these studies would be to ignore much of the available 
evidence on the effects of mandatory disclosure. 
An obvious way to observe the effects (such as on stock returns and 
volatility), if any, of mandatory disclosure is to examine any fundamental 
changes in the scope of mandatory disclosure in the United States. There 
have been two such changes. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange 
Act of 1934 represent the first of these fundamental changes. These two 
statutes placed extensive mandatory disclosure requirements on exchange-
listed firms (Exchange Act of 1934) and firms issuing securities to the 
public (Securities Act of 1933). The Securities Act Amendments of 1964 
represents the second fundamental change in mandatory disclosure 
requirements in the United States.163 The Securities Act Amendments of 
1964 extended the mandatory disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act 
of 1934 to most non-listed firms (the over-the-counter market).164 
In addition to these two fundamental changes, there have been several 
other smaller but important changes to mandatory disclosure in the U.S. that 
are promising candidates for measuring the effects of mandatory disclosure 
requirements. These changes include the requirement imposed by the SEC 
in December of 1980 that managers, in the Managerial Discussion and 
Analysis section of an annual report, discuss managers’ analysis of the 
future prospects of the company.165 A second important change occurred in 
1999 when the SEC mandated that the Exchange Act’s disclosure 
requirements be extended to firms trading on the OTC Bulletin Board.166 
These firms constitute most of the remaining over-the-counter firms not 
already subject to mandatory disclosure requirements as a result of the 
Securities Act Amendments of 1964.  
1. Studies of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 
1934 
George Stigler conducted the first empirical study of the effects of 
mandatory disclosure.167 His groundbreaking study focused on the 
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Securities Act of 1933, which regulates the disclosure requirements of new 
issues of securities.168 He compared the performance of new issues of 
securities pre-mandatory disclosure (1920s) to post-mandatory disclosure 
(1950s). The study concluded that there was no meaningful change in the 
stock return performance of new issues of securities pre- and post-mandated 
disclosure. However, the study did find that the variance of returns of new 
issues was substantially lower in the post-mandated disclosure period.169 A 
subsequent study confirmed Stigler’s results.170 
Based on these results, Stigler concluded that the Securities Act of 1933 
was unnecessary.171 
However, there are serious questions as to whether Stigler’s results are 
very informative about the desirability of the Securities Act of 1933. First, 
Stigler’s post-mandatory disclosure time period is several decades after the 
change in disclosure. It is unclear why one would expect, at this late period, 
stock return performance of new issues to be affected by mandatory 
disclosure requirements. The effects of mandatory disclosure, if any, were 
presumably capitalized into stock prices years earlier. Second, Stigler used 
no control group, beyond the market index, thereby making it almost 
impossible for him to control for changing market conditions over this long 
period of time. 
Carol Simon also examined the Securities Act of 1933.172 Her study 
found that the cross-sectional variance of monthly abnormal returns of new 
issues in the pre-mandated disclosure period (1926–1933) was larger than 
the cross-sectional variance of monthly abnormal returns of new issues in 
the post-mandated disclosure period (1934–1939) for non-NYSE, 
unseasoned companies.173 Using the cross-sectional variance as a proxy for 
investor uncertainty about a firm’s future prospects, she concluded that the 
Securities Act of 1933 reduced investor uncertainty for this group of firms. 
As with Stigler’s study, however, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions 
from these results. Perhaps the most serious problem with the study is the 
failure to provide a strong theoretical basis for using the cross-sectional 
variance as a proxy for investor uncertainty. Moreover, as with the Stigler 
study, there is no control group that was used to control for changing 
market conditions over the time period studied. 
In perhaps the most influential of all the mandated disclosure studies, 
George Benston examined the relative effect of the Exchange Act on two 
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sets of firms.174 This study compared the effects that the imposition of 
mandated disclosure had on a set of firms that were not voluntarily 
disclosing sales information prior to the Exchange Act, relative to a set of 
firms that were already voluntarily disclosing sales information. The set of 
voluntarily disclosing firms, in other words, served as Benston’s control 
group. Benston found that there was no difference in stock return 
performance between the two groups around the period of the enactment of 
the Exchange Act. Moreover, while the variance of stock prices for both 
groups declined, there was no relative change in the variance of the two 
groups.175 Based on these results, Benston—along with a number of legal 
academics176—concluded that the Exchange Act was not socially beneficial. 
The strength of Benston’s conclusions rests on how convincingly the 
study controls for changing market conditions through using the set of 
voluntarily disclosing firms as a control group. There are, however, serious 
problems with this control group. First, further examination of this group of 
voluntarily disclosing firms reveals that many of these firms were not 
disclosing a number of pieces of information that the Exchange Act later 
required be disclosed.177 Second, the Exchange Act introduced new liability 
standards that changed the legal consequences of making misleading 
disclosures. This important change introduced by the Exchange Act would 
affect both disclosing and non-disclosing firms.178 
2. Studies of the 1964 Securities Act Amendments 
A fairly recent study by the author looked at the effects of the 1964 
Securities Act Amendments’ imposition of mandatory disclosure on the 
over-the-counter market.179 Unlike some of the earlier studies, there exists a 
natural control group to control for changing market conditions for the time 
period studied (1962–1968): the listed companies that had been subject to 
mandatory disclosure requirements since 1934. The study used a unique 
database that consisted of stock price information three years prior to the 
effective date of the 1964 Securities Act Amendments (1962–65) and three 
years after these mandatory disclosure requirements were imposed (1965–
68). 
The study found that there was a substantial reduction in the volatility 
of over-the-counter stocks in the aftermath of the Securities Act 
Amendments. In the post-mandatory disclosure period (1965–68), there was 
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no statistically significant difference in the volatility of the over-the-counter 
stocks and that of the listed stocks.180 In the pre-mandatory disclosure 
period, in contrast, over-the-counter stocks experienced significantly higher 
levels of volatility compared to the listed market.181 This can be seen in the 
following graph of the yearly average variances of stocks in the over-the-
counter market and the listed market. The vertical black line marks the 
passage of the Securities Act Amendments. 182 
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In terms of abnormal stock returns, the study found that over-the-counter 
stocks experienced a positive abnormal return of approximately 6% in 
1963. The year 1963 was chosen because this was the year the market first 
learned that the Securities Act Amendments were being considered and 
were likely to be enacted. Consistent with this finding, a contemporaneous 
study found a positive abnormal return in the over-the-counter market in 
1963 in the range of 8%.183 
3. Studies of Other Mandated Disclosure Changes in the U.S. 
Another study focused on the requirement that managers discuss their 
firms’ likely future prospects and found that this improved firms’ share-
price accuracy.184 The study based this conclusion on two findings. First, it 
found that in the immediate aftermath of this requirement, the number of 
firms with below-average returns temporarily increased.185 This suggested 
that poorly performing firms were forced to disclose information that they 
would have otherwise attempted to keep hidden as a result of this 
requirement. In addition, the study found that the group of firms with 
average stock-return performance had lower levels of stock price 
synchronicity.186 Using stock-price synchronicity as a proxy for share price 
accuracy, this suggests that average performing companies had more 
informed stock prices. 
A second study examined the effect of the imposition, in 1999, of 
mandatory disclosure requirements on OTC Bulletin Board companies.187 
These firms are typically much smaller than NASDAQ- or NYSE-listed 
firms. OTC Bulletin Board firms that did not wish to comply with the new 
mandatory disclosure requirements could elect to be removed from the 
OTC Bulletin Board. The study found that firms that were already 
complying with the mandatory disclosure requirements experienced 
significant positive abnormal stock returns. However, firms that elected to 
move (approximately 76% of all firms not already in compliance) and firms 
that were not already in compliance but choose not to move experienced 
significantly lower returns than the firms already in compliance. These 
findings suggest that for a significant number of small, illiquid firms the 
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benefits of mandatory disclosure can often be outweighed by the costs that 
it imposes. 
4. Cross-Country Evidence 
Several studies have found that more demanding mandatory disclosure 
regimes are correlated with higher levels of financial development.188 This 
is consistent with the hypothesis that mandatory disclosure increases the use 
of external finance as a result of increasing the ability of controlling 
shareholders to credibly commit to return their firms’ profits to investors 
rather than diverting them to themselves. 
Increases in a country’s mandated disclosure requirements, as measured 
by a “disclosure index,” have been found to be associated with an increase 
in listed firms per capita (as well as increases in other proxies for financial 
development).189 A two-standard deviation increase in a country’s 
“disclosure index” was associated with an impressive 52% rise in the 
number of listed firms per capita.190 
Consistent with these findings, another recent study employing the 
same “disclosure index” found that in a dataset consisting of forty countries 
over the 1992–2001 period, countries with more demanding disclosure 
requirements had significantly lower costs of external finance.191 This effect 
on cost of capital was strongest in countries with segmented capital 
markets, i.e. countries in which there were impediments to foreign capital 
flowing into the country. Mandatory disclosure requirements, however, did 
continue to reduce firms’ cost of external finance even in countries 
relatively open to international capital flows. 
D. EVIDENCE FROM THE STATE COMPETITION LITERATURE 
Some commentators have stressed that the beneficial effects of allowing 
firms to select their state of incorporation, and thereby their governing 
corporate law, provides powerful evidence that mandatory disclosure 
requirements should be removed.192 If regulatory competition between the 
                                                                                                                 
 188. Most of the “law and finance” studies have not focused, however, on mandatory disclosure 
requirements, but rather have used indexes, such as the “anti-directors” index, that measure the 
strength of a country’s investor rights along other dimensions. See supra note 47 and 
accompanying text. 
 189. See La Porta et al., supra note 31. The “disclosure index” is the average of six disclosure 
proxies: requirements that a prospectus be delivered to potential investors; disclosure of insiders’ 
compensation; disclosure of ownership by large shareholders; disclosure of inside ownership; 
disclosure of contracts outside the normal course of business; and disclosure of transactions with 
related parties. Id. 
 190. Id. at 16. 
 191. See Luzi Hail & Christain Leuz, International Differences in the Cost of Equity Capital: 
Do Legal Institutions and Securities Regulation Matter?, 44 J. ACCT. RES. 485 (2006). 
 192. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 1, at 2383 (“The most important data bearing on the 
question whether the federal securities regime should be eliminated is . . . the research on the 
impact on shareholder welfare of state competition for charters.”). 
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states works well in the corporate law area, it should work as well in the 
securities field. More specifically, proponents of state competition have 
relied heavily on the argument that the empirical evidence indicates that the 
corporate law of Delaware, the winner of this competition for 
incorporations, improves firm valuation. 
Even granting the premise that the evidence on the merits of state 
competition in the provision of corporate law is central to evaluating the 
desirability of mandatory disclosure, this argument is unconvincing. The 
evidence that Delaware improves firm value is actually weak. While there is 
one study that claims to find that Delaware incorporation increases firm 
valuation,193 subsequent empirical studies have failed to find that Delaware 
law consistently improves firm valuation. Two of these subsequent studies 
found that Delaware incorporation increased firm value in the early 1990s, 
but in the later half of the 1990s the Delaware firm valuation effect was 
either nonexistent or negative.194 Another study found no effect of Delaware 
incorporation on firm value in the 1990s.195 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The theoretical case for mandatory disclosure for countries with 
concentrated ownership structures is strong. In other words, the case for 
mandatory disclosure is strong for virtually all countries around the world. 
Controlling shareholders will prefer a lax disclosure regime to serve the 
twin goals of protecting their private benefits of control and suppressing 
competition in both the market for capital and in the product market. 
As for the first goal, protecting private benefits of control, the evidence 
clearly demonstrates that controlling shareholders’ private benefits of 
control are substantial in many countries. Theory and evidence indicate that 
mandatory disclosure can reduce these private benefits of control 
substantially. Accordingly, existing controlling shareholders will tend to 
have a preference for a lax disclosure regime. 
As for the second goal, suppressing competition, there are again strong 
theoretical reasons, backed by an impressive body of empirical evidence, 
that mandatory disclosure can have the socially desirable effect of 
increasing competition between firms for capital and competition in the 
product market. Competition for capital will increase because some firms 
will find their access to external finance enhanced as a result of being able 
to credibly commit to a demanding disclosure regime. Firms that were able 
                                                                                                                 
 193. See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 
(2001). 
 194. Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 
118 Q. J. ECON. 107 (2003); Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 32 (2004). 
 195. Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409 
(2005). 
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to raise capital under a lax disclosure regime will have to compete with 
more firms for capital in the presence of a mandatory disclosure regime. 
Competition in the product market will increase as potential competitors 
have an enhanced ability to raise external finance to fund their operations. 
The empirical evidence on the effects of mandatory disclosure on stock 
returns, volatility and financial development is consistent with mandatory 
disclosure often having socially beneficial effects. In particular, several 
recent important empirical studies have provided new evidence pointing to 
mandated disclosure playing a socially beneficial role. 
Whether countries around the world should adopt or strengthen their 
mandatory disclosure requirements is a pressing policy question. The legal 
academic debate has largely ignored, however, the merits of mandatory 
disclosure regulation for most countries around the world, i.e. countries 
with concentrated ownership structures. This article has argued that 
mandatory disclosure requirements in securities regulation can play an 
important and socially beneficial role for these countries. 
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EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY, 
OF NEW JERSEY. 
 
PRINCIPAL OFFICE, 83 MONTGOMERY ST., JERSEY CITY, N.J 
EXECUTIVE OFFICES, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 
 
REPORT OF THE DIRECTORS 
To be presented at the third annual meeting of the shareholders, to be 
held at 83 Montgomery St., Jersey City, N. J., on Tuesday, April 5th, 1904, 
at twelve o’clock noon. 
The Directors submit herewith the audited statement of account for the 
year ending the 31st of December, 1903, being the first full year of business 
of the company. 
In the balance sheet presented the earnings of all the subsidiary 
companies are included for the period mentioned. 
The balance sheet shows carried to surplus for the twelve months the 
amount of $612,023.64 after paying quarterly dividends for the year at the 
rate of 6% per annum on its preferred stock and warrants and 10% on its 
common stock and warrants, and after charging off liberal amounts for 
depreciation on the various plants and $78,404.18 for special reserves. 
Attention is again called to the fact that the Company is paying 
dividends upon a large amount of capital which has been in but which has 
not been invested. The amount uninvested at the close of the period was 
about $3,000,000. 
The progress of the company during the past year was fully covered by 
the directors’ preliminary report which was sent to the shareholders early in 
January. 
The Directors retiring in conformity with the By-Laws are Messrs. 
George Eastman, Sir James Penders and Lord Kelvin. These gentlemen, 
being eligible, offer themselves for re-election. A director is also to be 
elected to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Mr. Edwin. 
The Auditors, Messrs. Price, Waterhouse & Company, also retire and 
offer themselves for re-election. 
By order of the Board. 
W. S. HUBBELL, 
Secretary 
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EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY 
COMBINED BALANCE SHEET, 311 
 
LIABILITIES 
CAPITAL STOCK: 
Preferred Stock authorized…   $10,000,000 
of which there has been issued,   $6,170,368.01 
Common Stock authorized, ...   25,000,000 
of which there has-been issued,   19,356,000.67 
       $25,526,368.68 
LESS:  Calls unpaid ……………………….          705,292.50 
       $24,821,076.18 
 
CAPITAL STOCK OF SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES 
OUTSTANDING ……………………………         $42,000.00 
CURRENT LIABILITIES: 
Accounts Payable, ………………………….         554,031.28 
Preferred Stock, Dividends payable January 
1st, 1904 ……………………………………             90,080.07 
Common Stock, Dividends payable January 
 1st, 1904 ……………………………………        470,872.56  
         $1,114,983.91  
 
SURPLUS: 
Balance of 31st December, 1902 per Balance 
Sheet ………………………………….        $468,999.29 
Profits of Combined Companies for the year 
Ending 31st December 1903.        2,925,691.16 
  $3,394,690.45 
DEDUCT: 
Dividends and Interest, 
6% on Preferred Stock………………       $368,058.57 
10% on Common Stock ……………      1,866,804.77 
  $2,234,863.34 
On Outstanding Stock of Sub-sidiary  
Companies ……………                       400.00 
  $2,235,863.34 
Special Reserves ………………….     ____78,404.18  
         $2,313,667.52  
$1,081,022.93 
   $27,081,022.93 
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AND ITS SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES. 
31ST DECEMBER, 1903. 
 
ASSETS 
COST OF PROPERTY, including Real Estate, Buildings, Plant, 
Machinery, Patents and Good Will,    $17,513,685.54 
 
CURRENT ASSETS: 
Merchandise, Materials and Supplies, ………………    2,512,325.17 
Accounts and Bills Receivable, ………………………..1,043,996.45 
Railway Bonds and other Investments, …………….…...1,753,594.58 
Call Loans, ………………………………………………..650,000.00 
Cash at Banks and on Hand, ……………………………3,200,269.58 
Miscellaneous, …………………………………………..  285,211.70 
          $9,545,397.48 
        $27,059,083.02 
 
We have examined the books of the Eastman Kodak company of New 
Jersey, and of Kodak Limited for the year ending December 31, 1903 and 
we have been furnished with certified returns from the American and 
European Branches, The Kodak Gesellschaft and the Societe Anonymè 
Francaise for the same period and we certify that the Balance Sheet at that 
date is correctly prepared therefrom. 
We have satisfied ourselves that during the year only actual additions 
and extensions have been charged to cost of property and that ample 
provision has been made for Depreciation. 
We are satisfied that the valuations of the Inventories of stocks on hand, 
as certified by the responsible officials, have been carefully and accurately, 
full provision has been made for Bad and Doubtful Accounts Receivable 
and for all ascertainable Liabilities. 
We have verified the cash and securities by actual inspection and by 
certificates from the depositories, and are of opinion that the stocks and 
bonds are fully worth the value at which they are stated in the Balance 
Sheet. 
And we certify that in our opinion the Balance Sheet is properly drawn 
up so as to show the true financial position of the Company and its 
Subsidiary Companies, and the Profits thereof for the year ending at that 
date. 
(Signed) PRICE, WATERHOUSE & Co. 
Chartered Accountants 
54 William Street, 
New York City 
28th March, 1904 
